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Abstract	
Quantifier	 variance	 is	 a	 prominent	 approach	 to	 contemporary	
metaontology	 that	 is	 noted	 for	 leading	 to	 a	 deflationary	 view	 of	
ontological	 debates.	 Here	 we	 explain	 the	 metasemantics	 of	 quantifier	
variance	 and	 distinguish	 between	modest	 and	 strong	 forms	 of	 variance	
(Section	 I),	 explain	 some	 key	 applications	 (Section	 II),	 clear	 up	 some	
misunderstandings	and	address	objections	(Section	III),	and	point	the	way	
toward	 future	 directions	 of	 quantifier-variance-related	 research	 (Section	
IV).	
I.	What	is	Quantifier	Variance?	
Different	possible	languages	have	different	concepts	of	what	“exists”	or	what	“there	is”.	
Despite	this	key	difference	between	them,	some	of	these	languages	are	equally	good	as	
tools	for	describing	reality.	These	are	two	of	the	central	claims	of	quantifier	variance,	a	
highly	influential	deflationary	view	in	contemporary	metaontology.	Variance	is	rooted	in	
widely	accepted	metasemantic	principles,	yet	 it	remains	controversial,	since	it	deflates	
the	 pretensions	 of	 philosophical	 ontology.	 Additionally,	 variance	 is	 very	 widely	
misunderstood.	 A	 proper	 understanding	 starts	 with	 the	 metasemantic	 background	
leading	to	variance,	in	both	of	its	principle	forms.	
Language	and	Meaning.	Linguistic	meaning	is	determined	by	actual	and	possible	
language	 use.	 	 Taken	 baldly,	 this	 is	 almost	 a	 truism.	 But	 more	 plausibly,	 this	 slogan	
about	use	expresses	a	commitment	to	charity	 in	 interpretation.	Minimally,	charity	ties	
meaning	 to	 use	 by	 ruling	 out	 interpretations	 that	 see	 those	 we	 are	 interpreting	 as	
uttering	falsehoods	inexplicably.		
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	 Say	that	an	 interpretation	of	 language	L	assigns	coarse-grained	truth	conditions	
to	 sentences	 of	 L	 relative	 to	 each	possible	 context	 of	 utterance.	 Coarse-grained	 truth	
conditions	 can	 be	 modeled	 as	 sets	 of	 possible	 worlds	 (Stalnaker	 1984);	 and	 these	
functions	from	contexts	of	utterance	to	coarse	truth	conditions	are	called	“characters”	
(Kaplan	1989).	A	charity-based	metasemantics	assigns	L	the	interpretation	that,	when	all	
is	said-and-done,	when	every	disposition	to	correct	and	revise	is	accounted	for,	makes	
the	 best	 sense	 of	 the	 linguistic	 behavior	 of	 L-speakers	 by	 making	 their	 considered	
utterances	come	out	true	in	actual	and	possible	circumstances,	ceteris	paribus.		
	 Charity-based	 approaches	 are	 top	 down	 –	 they	 explain	 the	 meanings	 of	
subsentential	expressions	in	terms	of	the	meanings	of	whole	sentences.	Once	again	this	
respects	the	dictum	that	meaning	is	use,	as	the	meanings	of	subsentential	expressions	
will	be	 fully	explained	 in	 terms	of	 their	usage	 in	 the	 language.	By	contrast,	bottom	up	
theorists	start	with	the	meanings	of	subsentential	expressions	and	then	go	on	to	explain	
the	meanings	of	sentences	in	terms	of	them.		To	top	down	theorists,	this	is	mysterious	
—	what	magic	could	attach	meaning	to	a	subsentential	expression	apart	from	its	use?			
	 Quantifier	 Expressions.	 What	 makes	 an	 expression	 in	 a	 given	 language	 a	
“quantifier”	on	a	charity-based,	top	down	approach	is	that	it	is	used	as	a	quantifier.	The	
inferential	 role	 of	 a	 quantifier	 expression	 is	 its	 defining	 feature	—	 an	 expression	 in	 a	
given	language	is	an	existential	quantifier,	for	instance,	if	it	plays	the	inferential	role	of	
an	existential	quantifier	 in	that	 language.	No	doubt	the	inferential	role	of	“there	is”	or	
“exists”	 in	 natural	 language	 is	 more	 complex	 than	 the	 role	 of	 “∃”	 in	 formal	 logical	
languages,	 but	 the	 formal-syntactic	 role	 of	 “∃”	 provides	 a	 tidy	 approximation	 of	 the	
informal	inferential	role	of	“exists”	or	“there	is”	in	English.	The	expression	“there	is”	is	
an	 existential	 quantifier,	 in	 English,	 roughly	 because	 for	 name	 “a”	 and	 predicate	 “F”,	
from	“a	is	F”,	“there	is	an	F”	follows;	and	if	a	non-“a”	claim	follows	from	“a	is	F”,	with	no	
auxiliary	assumptions	made	about	“a”,	then	that	same	thing	also	follows	from	“there	is	
an	F”.		Expressions	that	obey	this	role	unrestrictedly,	for	all	names	and	predicates	that	
could	be	 introduced	 into	the	 language,	express	the	 language’s	unrestricted	concept	of	
existence.			
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	 Combining	 a	 top	 down	 charity	 approach	 to	 meaning	 with	 the	 inferential	 role	
priority	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	“quantifier”	results	in	a	deflationary	metasemantics	
for	quantificational	claims.		This	metasemantics	entails	modest	quantifier	variance.		Call	
a	language	with	quantifier	expressions	a	“quantifier”	language.	All	human	languages	are	
quantifier	 languages,	and	maybe	all	possible	 languages	are;	our	 terminology	 is	neutral	
on	 this.	 Modest	 variance	 says	 that	 there	 are	 many	 distinct	 quantifier	 languages	 —	
quantifier	languages	where	translating	one	language’s	quantifier	into	the	other’s	results	
in	massive	 failures	 of	 charity.	 This	 follows	 almost	 immediately	 from	 top	down	 charity	
and	our	account	of	quantifiers.	Obviously	there	are	many	possible	patterns	of	language	
use,	distinct	from	each	other	but	each	with	expressions	playing	the	role	that	“there	is”	
plays	 in	 English	 (of	 course,	 related	 expressions	 like	 “refers”	 and	 “object”	will	 likewise	
vary	in	meaning	between	distinct	quantifier	languages,	and	variation	in	the	meaning	of	
the	 referential	 apparatus	 of	 the	 language	 will	 induce	 variation	 in	 the	 meaning	 of	
ordinary	predicates	like	“red”	and	“on”	as	well).	
	 Quantifier	variance	is	often	associated	with	a	deflationary	view	of	philosophical	
ontology,	so	we	must	stress	that	modest	variance	is	not	necessarily	hostile	to	ontology.	
In	 fact,	 several	 prominent	 contemporary	 ontologists,	 including	 Cian	 Dorr	 (2005)	 and	
Theodore	 Sider	 (2009),	 count	 as	 modest	 variantists	 by	 our	 reckoning.	 	 The	 anti-
ontological	arguments	associated	with	quantifier	variance	rely	on	a	stronger	form,	one	
that	builds	upon	modest	variance.	This	stronger	form	must	now	be	explained.	
	 Equivalent	Descriptions.	Languages	are,	among	other	things,	tools	for	describing	
the	world.		And	like	most	tools,	languages	can	be	better,	worse,	or	equal	for	the	task	at	
hand.		When	two	languages	are	equal	for	any	possible	descriptive	task,	we	say	that	the	
languages	are	equivalent,	and	that,	 informally,	despite	any	differences	between	them,	
that	 they	 describe	 the	 very	 same	 facts	 or	 states	 of	 affairs.	 The	 top	 down	 charity	
approach	allows	 for	 a	 simple	account	of	 language-wide	equivalence	—	 two	 languages	
are	equivalent	just	in	case	they	can	express	all	and	only	the	same	characters,	the	same	
functions	 from	 contexts	 to	 coarse-grained	 truth	 conditions.	 When	 languages	 are	
equivalent	 in	 this	 sense,	 then	 for	 any	 sentence	 in	 the	 language	 of	 one,	 there	 is	 a	
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sentence	 in	 the	 language	 of	 the	 other	 that	 is	 true	 in	 all	 and	 only	 the	 same	 possible	
circumstances.	
This	 provides	 a	 very	 natural	 sense	 in	 which	 speakers	 of	 each	 language	 can	
express	 all	 and	 only	 the	 same	 facts.	 There	 is	 no	 state	 of	 the	 world,	 considered	 in	 a	
coarse-grained	sense,	that	speakers	of	one	language	but	not	the	other	are	sensitive	to.		
Of	 course,	 each	 language	 may	 well	 describe	 these	 states	 of	 the	 world	 in	 apparently	
incompatible	ways,	using	their	own	idiosyncratic	notions.	But	what	could	it	mean	to	say	
that	one	of	these	ways	of	describing	things	was	closer	to	the	truth	than	the	other,	when	
they	are	both	 literally	 true,	 in	 their	home	 language?	 It	 is	difficult	 to	see	how	one	of	a	
pair	 of	 equivalent	 languages	 could	 be	 a	 better	 description	 of	 reality	 than	 another.	Of	
course,	 there	 are	 fine-grained	 notions	 of	 equivalence	 that	 distinguish	 between	
character-wise	 equivalent	 languages,	 but	 when	 considered	 merely	 as	 tools	 for	
describing	reality,	this	doesn’t	seem	to	matter.	
Metaphysical	 Merit.	 Accepting	 that	 equivalent	 languages	 are	 of	 equal	
metaphysical	merit,	along	with	modest	variance,	leads	to	immodest	or	strong	quantifier	
variance.	 Strong	 variantists	 endorse	 an	 egalitarian	 version	 of	 the	 pluralism	 about	
quantifier	languages	endorsed	by	modest	variantists.		Strong	quantifier	variance	applies	
to	 quantifier	 languages	 the	 general	 thought	 that	 truth-conditionally	 equivalent	
languages	are	equally	good,	metaphysically	speaking.	It	claims	that	when	two	quantifier	
languages	are	equivalent,	there	is	no	use	asking	which	of	them	is	metaphysically	better	
or	which	better	reflects	objective	reality.	Nothing	else	about	the	metaphysical	ordering	
of	 languages	 is	 implied;	 but	 for	 strong	 variantists,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 single,	 metaphysically	
special	 language,	 it	 can	 only	 be	 because	 that	 language	 can	 express	 truth	 conditions	
inexpressible	 in	any	other	 language.	Of	course,	while	strong	variance	 is	metaphysically	
egalitarian,	 it	 is	 not	 egalitarian	 in	 any	 stronger	 sense.	 Variantists	 can	 allow	 there	 are	
often	 important	 practical	 reasons	 for	 preferring	 one	 quantifier	 language	 over	 an	
equivalent	language.	
	 Strong	 quantifier	 variance	 takes	 the	 quantifier	 language	 pluralism	 of	 modest	
variance	and	adds	to	 it	an	account	of	 the	metaphysical	merit	of	 languages	 in	terms	of	
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their	truth-conditional	equivalence.		Variance,	both	modest	and	strong,	is	interesting	in	
itself,	but	it	can	also	be	applied	in	philosophically	fruitful	ways.	
II.	Applications	of	Quantifier	Variance	
Here	we	explain	five	of	quantifier	variance’s	most	important	philosophical	applications.	
Merely	Verbal	Disputes	 in	Ontology	 (Putnam	1987,	 2004,	Hirsch	2008a,	 2009).		
According	 to	 modest	 variance,	 for	 many	 ontological	 disputes,	 there	 are	 possible	
languages	associated	with	each	side	 in	 the	dispute	 that	make	the	typical	assertions	of	
that	 side	 come	 out	 true.	 	 So	 there	 is	 a	 possible	 language	 N	 in	 which	 the	 standard	
assertions	of	mereological	nihilists	come	out	 true,	and	a	possible	 language	U	 in	which	
the	 standard	 assertions	 of	 mereological	 universalists	 come	 out	 true.	 There	 is	 no	
metasemantic	 glue	 sticking	 words	 to	 meanings,	 so	 if	 philosophers	 depart	 drastically	
enough	from	standard	usage,	and	refuse	to	coordinate	or	defer	to	other	speakers,	we	
should	 attempt	 to	 interpret	 them	 on	 their	 own	 terms.	 When	 we	 do	 this,	 charity	
supports	the	claim	that	nihilists	are	speaking	N	and	universalists	are	speaking	U.	Since	
these	philosophers	are	speaking	different	 languages,	 their	dispute	over	whether	 there	
are	chairs	is	merely	verbal:	they	each	speak	the	truth	in	their	own	language	and	thus	talk	
past	each	other.	
They	could	attempt	to	reinstate	their	dispute	by	touting	the	superiority	of	their	
own	 language,	 whether	 N	 or	 U,	 over	 the	 other,	 metaphysically	 speaking.	 But	 for	
standard	 ontological	 disputes,	 including	 this	 one,	 the	 relevant	 languages	 are	 truth-
conditionally	equivalent.	So,	according	to	strong	variance,	N	and	U	will	also	be	of	equal	
metaphysical	merit.	 This	means	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 factual	 distinguishing	 these	 two	
languages	—	each	theorist	speaks	the	truth	in	their	own	language	and	each	competing	
language	 is	 an	 equivalent	 description	 of	 the	 very	 same	 facts.	 	 There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	
prefer	 one	 language	 over	 the	 other,	metaphysically	 speaking.	 This	 provides	 a	 second	
sense	in	which	the	dispute	is	“merely	verbal”.	
Ordinary	Ontology	(Hirsch	2003,	2005).	English	speakers	innocent	of	philosophy	
reject	the	distinctive	claims	of	mereological	nihilists	and	mereological	universalists	alike.	
But	English-speaking	ontologists	seem	untroubled	by	this,	apparently	thinking	that	since	
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there	 is	 only	 one	 thing	 for	 “exists”	 to	 mean,	 ordinary	 English	 claims	 about	 material	
objects	cannot	be	charitably	interpreted.	According	to	modest	quantifier	variance,	this	is	
false	 —	 there	 is	 a	 quantifier	 language	 in	 which	 the	 material	 object	 claims	 made	 by	
English	speakers	come	out	true.	Charity	demands	that	we	interpret	English	speakers	as	
speaking	this	language,	so	that,	in	English,	“there	are	turkeys”	and	“there	are	trout”	are	
both	true,	while	“there	are	trout-turkeys”	is	false.	Since	this	natural	language	concept	of	
existence	 does	 not	 perfectly	 correspond	 to	 any	 of	 the	 standard	 positions	 in	 debates	
about	material	 objects,	 if	 participants	 in	 these	debates	 are	 speaking	 English,	 they	 are	
often	speaking	falsely.	Strong	variantists	will	add	that,	since	it	is	plausible	that	English	is	
equivalent	 to	 N,	 U,	 and	 the	 other	 languages	 of	 metaphysicians,	 English	 itself	 is	 a	
perfectly	legitimate	quantifier	language,	metaphysically	speaking.	
Vagueness	 about	 Existence	 (Hirsch	 1999,	 2002).	 	 It	 is	 widely	 believed	 that	
existence	claims	cannot	be	vague.		This	is	because	vagueness	is	usually	thought	to	be	a	
matter	of	semantic	 indecision	—	there	are	various	possible	things	we	could	mean	by	a	
term	like	“bald”,	but	our	usage	of	the	term	doesn’t	decide	between	all	of	them,	so	the	
term	 is	 vague.	 	Given	 this	picture	of	 vagueness,	 some	philosophers	 (Lewis	1986)	have	
argued	 that	 since	 there	 is	 only	 one	 possible	 thing	 that	 could	 be	 meant	 by	 “exists”,	
existence	claims	cannot	possibly	be	vague.	But	once	quantifier	variance	is	accepted,	we	
can	easily	see	how	there	could	be	semantic	indecision	and	vagueness	over	“exists”:	our	
usage	could	fail	to	decide	between	various	assignments	of	truth	conditions	to	sentences	
containing	 “exists”,	 while	 on	 each	 assignment	 “exists”	 continues	 to	 play	 the	 same	
formal-syntactic	role	and	thus	remains	a	quantifier.	
Mathematical	 Freedom.	 (Berry	 2015,	 Warren	 forthcoming).	 	 Mathematicians	
freely	introduce	theories	about	new	kinds	of	mathematical	entities.	If	a	mathematician	
introduces	a	new	kind,	the	Fs,	 it	would	be	 inappropriate	within	mathematics	to	object	
that	no	evidence	had	been	given	that	Fs	exist	(provided	at	least	that	the	assumption	of	
Fs	 is	 consistent).	 	 On	 bottom	 up	 views	 of	 the	 metasemantics	 of	 quantifiers	 this	
procedure	 is	 either	 epistemically	 reckless	 or	 wholly	 inexplicable.	 However,	 as	 was	
perhaps	 first	 recognized	 by	 Carnap	 (1934),	 quantifier	 variance	 makes	 sense	 of	
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mathematical	freedom	—	mathematicians	are	introducing	new	ways	of	using	sentences	
containing	“there	are”	and	“exists”.	Charity	to	use	demands	that	we	interpret	them	as	
speaking	 truly,	 if	we	 can.	 And	 as	 quantifier	 variantists,	we	 can.	 	 In	 this	way,	 variance	
rationalizes	 standard	 mathematical	 practice	 by	 making	 explicable	 its	 ontological	
freedom.	Other	approaches	to	metaontology	are	 forced	to	criticize	the	 internal	norms	
of	mathematics	on	purely	philosophical	grounds.	
Paradoxes	and	Indefinite	Extensibility.	 (Warren	2017).	Naïve	set	theory	 is	beset	
by	 paradoxes,	 most	 famously	 Russell’s	 paradox	 concerning	 the	 set	 of	 all	 non-self-
membered	sets.		One	response	to	these	paradoxes,	inaugurated	by	Russell	himself,	sees	
set-theoretic	 quantifiers	 like	 “all	 sets”	 as	 being	 indefinitely	 extensible.	 The	 idea	 being	
that	when	you	attempt	to	quantify	over	all	and	only	the	sets	you	somehow,	someway,	
end	up	being	able	to	talk	about	another	set	that	was	not	in	the	original	collection.		This	
idea	 has	 long	 been	 puzzling,	 since	 clearly	we	 aren’t	 creating	 a	 new	 set	when	we	 run	
through	 the	 reasoning	of	 the	Russell	 paradox!	But	quantifier	 variance	makes	 sense	of	
extensibility	by	seeing	the	Russell	reasoning	as	creating	not	a	new	set,	but	rather	a	new	
and	 slightly	 expanded	 concept	 of	 “all	 sets”,	 based	 on	 a	 slight	 change	 in	 the	 usage	 of	
sentences	containing	“all”.	In	this	fashion,	variance	provides	an	all	purpose	strategy	for	
demystifying	the	hitherto	puzzling	paradoxes	of	set	theory	and	absolute	generality.	
III.	Misunderstandings	and	Objections	
There	are	many	ways	to	misunderstand	quantifier	variance,	most	of	them	witnessed	in	
the	literature.		For	the	sake	of	clarity,	let	us	make	fully	explicit	some	of	what	is	merely	
implicit	in	the	foregoing.	
	 Quantifier	 Variance	 is	 not	 anti-realism.	 Ontological	 anti-realists	 think	 that,	 in	
some	 fashion	 or	 other,	 objects	 depend	 for	 their	 existence	 on	 human	 practices.	 	 But	
while	 it	 is	undeniable	that	some	objects	depend	upon	humans	(governments,	national	
borders,	thoughts),	it	seems	equally	undeniable	that	other	objects	do	not	(stars,	rocks,	
numbers).	 	Nothing	 in	quantifier	variance	conflicts	with	 this	bit	of	good	sense.	 In	 fact,	
while	variance	says	much	about	the	nature	of	our	concept	of	existence,	it	says	nothing	
at	all	about	the	nature	of	the	things	that	exist	(Hirsch	2002).	To	reason	from	quantifier	
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variance	 to	 ontological	 anti-realism	 is	 just	 as	 confused	 as	 reasoning	 from	 the	 human	
invention	of	the	concept	of	“planet”	to	the	human	invention	of	planets.	
	 Quantifier	 Variance	 is	 not	 verificationism.	 Verificationists	 think	 that	 claims	 are	
only	meaningful	 if	they	have	clear	verification	conditions.	This	is	usually	understood	as	
entailing	that	disputes	are	substantive	just	in	case	they	can	be	settled,	in	principle.		The	
logical	 positivists	 of	 legend	 used	 verificationism	 as	 a	 club	 with	 which	 to	 bash	
metaphysics,	and	some	(Hawthorne	2009,	for	example)	have	worried	that	variantists	are	
wielding	 the	 same	 club	 for	 the	 same	 purpose.	 But	 this	 is	mistaken;	 strong	 variantists	
think	disputes	are	metaphysically	insubstantial	when	each	side’s	language	is	equivalent	
to	the	other.	This	criterion	only	entails	verificationism	if	“equivalent	to”	is	understood	to	
mean,	“has	 the	same	verification	conditions	as”,	but	as	we	have	seen,	 this	 is	not	how	
quantifier	 variantists	 understand	 “equivalence”	 (Putnam	 1983,	 Hirsch	 2011,	 2016,	
Warren	2015	appendix).	Unlike	verificationism,	the	charity-based	metasemantics	behind	
quantifier	variance	allows	 that	many	substantive	disputes	—	some	disputes	about	 the	
past,	for	example	—	may	forever	be	impossible	to	settle.	
	 Quantifier	Variance	does	not	venerate	quantification.	Some	think	that	variantists	
must	 mean	 something	 special	 by	 a	 “quantifier”,	 beyond	 obeying	 a	 particular	 formal-
syntactic	role.	 	A	persistent	version	of	this	confusion	says	that	variantists	must	explain	
different	quantifier	meanings	 in	 terms	of	differing	domains	of	quantification	 (Finn	and	
Bueno	2018).	Obviously	this	 is	a	nonstarter	—	speakers	of	N	cannot	and	do	not	admit	
that	 U’s	 quantifiers	 range	 over	 a	 domain	 containing	 composites	 (charitable	 critics	 of	
variance,	such	as	Sider	(2009),	recognize	this).	There	are	also	more	subtle	ways	to	read	
something	special	into	“quantifier”	variance	(Dorr	2014).	But	whether	expressed	simply	
or	 subtly,	 the	 thought	 is	 wrong.	 Those	 who	 think	 that	 something	more	 than	 formal-
syntactic	 role	 is	 required	 for	 an	 expression	 is	 to	 count	 as	 a	 “real”	 quantifier	 should	
interpret	 our	 claims	 as	 concerning	only	quantifier-like	 expressions	—	expressions	 that	
have	the	same	formal-syntactic	role	as	our	quantifiers.	Everything	that	is	of	interest	to	
variantists	 can	 easily	 be	 said	 using	 this	 alternative	 vocabulary,	 though	 we	 think	 that	
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talking	 in	terms	of	quantifier	variance	 rather	than	quantifier	elimination	 is	much	more	
natural	and	suggestive	(Hirsch	2011	introduction).	
Even	 with	 these	 misunderstandings	 avoided,	 quantifier	 variance	 and	 its	
applications	have	been	challenged	in	the	literature.		Three	of	these	challenges	warrant	
some	discussion.	
	 The	 Collapse	 Argument	 (Hale	 and	 Wright	 2009,	 Dorr	 2014,	 Rossberg	
unpublished).	 Imagine	that	we	quantifier	variantists	are	speaking	N	and	considering	U.	
As	variantists,	we	admit	that	the	sentence	“Bugs	is	a	bunny”	is,	while	false	in	N,	true	in	
U.	But	 (it	 is	claimed)	admitting	that	 it	 is	 true	 in	U	that	Bugs	 is	a	bunny,	entails,	by	the	
inferential	role	of	our	N-quantifier,	that,	something	(in	our	N-sense	of	“something”)	is	a	
bunny.	Which	—	 since	 bunnies	 are	 composite	 objects	—	 contradicts	 the	 assumption	
that	 we	 were	 speaking	 N.	 	 It	 seems	 that	 N	 is	 not	 a	 possible	 language	 and	 modest	
variance	is	false.	
	 This	argument,	based	on	one	given	 in	Harris	1982,	has	tempted	many	critics	of	
variance.		But	it	is	based	on	a	confusion:	admitting,	in	N,	that	“Bugs	is	a	bunny”	is	true	in	
U,	is	not	tantamount	to	admitting,	in	N,	that	Bugs	is	a	bunny.		To	think	otherwise	is	to	
confuse	use	and	mention.		In	a	language	that	calls	sharks	“dogs”	but	is	otherwise	exactly	
like	English,	“dogs	live	in	the	water”	is	true.		We	can	all	see	that	this	does	not	imply,	in	
English,	 that	dogs	 live	 in	 the	water,	 but	 the	mistake	made	by	 this	brainless	 argument	
seems	to	be	the	very	mistake	made	by	the	collapse	argument.		Discussing	the	language	
U,	within	N,	is	very	different	than	having,	within	N,	the	true	sentence,	“Bugs	is	a	bunny”.	
Intra-language	 versions	 of	 collapse,	 though	 valid,	 don’t	 threaten	 quantifier	 variance,	
while	 inter-language	 versions	 threaten	 quantifier	 variance,	 but	 are	 fallacious	 (Warren	
2015).	The	fallacy	has	only	escaped	notice	because	the	argument	is	typically	presented	
formally,	 in	 either	 a	 natural	 deduction	 system	 or	 a	 mathematically	 powerful	
metatheory.	But	a	fallacy	is	still	a	fallacy,	no	matter	how	many	technicalities	are	piled	on	
top	of	it.	
	 The	Tarskian	Argument	(Hawthorne	2006,	Eklund	2009).	 Imagine	again	that	we	
variantists	are	speaking	N	and	considering	U.	As	variantists	we	should	be	able	to	freely	
	 10	
admit	 that	 U	 is	 a	 possible	 language,	 in	 some	 general	 sense	 (we	 are	 not	 presently	
concerned	 with	 its	 psychological	 possibility).	 But	 according	 to	 many	 influential	
approaches	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 language	 and	 linguistics,	 claiming	 a	 natural	 language	
possible	 requires	 the	 ability	 to	 formulate	 a	 Tarski	 1933	 style	 semantic	 theory	 for	 that	
language.	And	 this	 seems	 impossible	 for	 the	 “smaller”	 language	 to	 do	 in	 the	 cases	 of	
interest	 to	 variantists.	 For	 example,	 a	 Tarski-style	 treatment	 of	 U,	 within	 N,	 would	
explain	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 U-sentence	 “Bugs	 is	 a	 bunny”	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 referent	 of	
“Bugs”	 has	 the	 property	 expressed	 by	 “is	 a	 bunny”.	 But	 there	 is,	 according	 to	 N-
speakers,	no	suitable	referent	for	“Bugs”,	since	“is	a	bunny”	has	empty	extension,	and	
so	 a	 Tarski-style	 approach	 seems	 impossible.	 If	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 N-speakers	 cannot	
admit	that	U	is	a	possible	language,	contradicting	modest	variance.	
	 In	response,	some	(Dorr	2005,	Sider	2007)	have	advocated	that	variantists	reject	
the	 standard	 Tarskian	 approach	 to	 semantics,	 at	 least	 as	 a	 constraint	 on	 admitting	 a	
language	possible.	 	We	are	sympathetic	 to	this	suggestion,	but	have	elsewhere	shown	
that	it	is	not	strictly	required	(Hirsch	and	Warren	forthcoming).		Through	devious	uses	of	
the	 resources	 of	 set	 theory,	 N-speakers	 can	 give	 a	 perfectly	 standard	 —	 though	
complicated	—	Tarskian	semantics	for	U	without	going	beyond	the	resources	of	N.	This	
completely	 undermines	 this	 particular	 version	 of	 the	 Tarskian	 argument,	 and	 it	 is	
plausible	that	similar	results	also	hold	for	all	other	cases	of	interest.	
	 Heavyweight	Ontology	 (Sider	 2001	 introduction,	 2009,	 2011,	 Fine	2001,	 2009).		
Following	Quine	 (1948),	 quantifier	 variantists	 see	 existential	 quantification	 over	 Fs	 as	
expressing	ontological	commitment	to	Fs.	This	is	still	widely	but	not	universally	accepted	
in	 philosophy.	 Recently	 many	 metaphysicians	 have	 claimed	 that	 even	 if	 existential	
quantifiers	carry	some	kind	of	“lightweight”	ontological	commitment,	what	ontologists	
really	 care	 about	 is	 “heavyweight”	 ontological	 commitment,	 which	 is	 not	 carried	 by	
standard	 quantifiers	 alone.	 There	 is	 disagreement	 over	 the	 particulars,	 but	 most	 of	
these	heavyweight	ontologists	think	ontological	commitment	is	carried	by	some	sort	of	
special	metaphysical	primitive	such	as	“in	 reality”	or	 the	 like	—	for	example	by	saying	
that	ontological	commitment	to	Fs	is	expressed	by	the	claim	that,	in	reality,	there	are	Fs.	
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With	this	type	of	move	made,	there	no	longer	seems	to	be	any	reason	for	ontologists	to	
worry	about	quantifier	variance	or	deflationary	arguments	based	upon	it.	
	 Despite	the	recent	popularity	of	this	strategy,	it	 is	difficult	to	see	how	it,	alone,	
could	salvage	substantive	ontology.	Either	sentences	containing	“in	reality”	(or	the	like)	
have	clear	truth	conditions	in	the	language	of	heavyweight	ontology,	or	they	do	not.		If	
they	do,	then	the	situation	is	not	importantly	different	than	it	was	with	the	quantifiers	
—	we	are	able	to	charitably	 interpret	each	disagreeing	heavyweight	ontologist	so	that	
they	 speak	 the	 truth	 in	 their	 own	 language	 and	 thus	 all	 talk	 past	 each	 other	 (Hirsch	
2008b).		On	the	other	hand,	if	these	sentences	do	not	have	clear	truth	conditions,	then	
ontological	claims,	questions,	and	disputes	are	problematic	for	that	very	reason	(Warren	
2016).	 	 In	neither	case	has	substantive	ontology	been	rehabilitated.	The	devil	 is	 in	the	
details,	 but	 this	 general	 situation	 makes	 us	 highly	 skeptical	 about	 the	 prospect	 of	
rehabilitating	 substantive	 ontology	 simply	 by	 moving	 away	 from	 quantifiers	 as	 the	
source	of	serious	ontological	commitment.	
	 IV.	Future	Directions	
Here	we	 indicate	four	directions	 for	 future	quantifier-variance-related	work.	Of	
course,	our	list	does	not	exhaust	the	possibilities.	
Strange	Languages.	Variantists	think	that	there	are	possible	languages	that	have	
distinct	 concepts	of	 “what	 exists.”	But	 are	 there	 any	 limits	 on	how	 intuitively	 strange	
such	 alternative	 languages	 can	 be?	 Some	 quantifier	 languages	 are	 bizarre,	 such	 as	
Hirsch’s	 Contacti	 language,	 where	 the	 identity	 of	 an	 “object”	 over	 time	 is	 partly	
determined	by	 its	contact	relations	to	other	things,	so	that	 if	 two	“objects”	come	 into	
contact	 with	 each	 other	 they	 exchange	 all	 of	 their	 properties	 including	 their	 spatial	
locations	and	material	composition	(see	Hirsch	1993	for	details).	Can	we	really	conceive	
of	 any	 beings	 speaking	 Contacti	 as	 their	 mother	 tongue?	 Can	 we	 conceive	 of	 beings	
using	 a	 language	 like	 this	 at	 all?	 Contacti	 is	 a	 describable	 language	 (we	 have	 just	
described	 it),	and	what’s	more	 it	 seems	 that	 it	 is	 truth-conditionally	equivalent	 to	our	
language,	so	for	anything	we	can	say,	they	can	say	something	to	the	same	effect.	 	 It	 is	
not	clear,	therefore,	what	the	nature	of	the	intuitive	difficulty	is	in	imagining	speakers	of	
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such	 a	 language.	Nor	 is	 it	 clear	whether	 the	 intuitive	 difficulty	 is	 a	 real	 difficulty.	 But	
variantists	should	acknowledge	the	insistent	intuitions	about	such	cases	and	attempt	to	
account	for	them,	in	some	fashion.	There	may	be	plausible	metasemantic	principles	that	
exclude	certain	describable	quantifier	meanings	while	admitting	others.	The	matter	calls	
for	further	investigation,	with	quantifier	variance	kept	firmly	in	mind.	
Human	Limits.	The	question	we	have	just	been	sketching	concerns	the	possibility	
of	beings,	whether	human	or	not,	speaking	languages	with	wildly	different	concepts	of	
existence	 than	 ours.	 A	 related	 question	 is	 whether	 humans	 could	 be	 raised	 to	 speak	
such	languages,	as	their	mother	tongue.		This	may	be	principally	an	empirical	question,	
informed	by	matters	of	psychology	and	neuroscience,	but	there	is	much	in	it	that	is	grist	
for	philosophical	 reflection.	 	Many	of	 the	alternative	 languages	are	 truth-conditionally	
equivalent	and	so	express	the	same	facts	as	our	own,	but	are	there	deep	connections,	
perhaps	 even	a	priori	 connections,	 between	how	our	 concept	 of	 existence	 articulates	
the	facts	and	how	human	patterns	of	attention	and	learning	operate?		A	start	on	these	
questions	has	been	provided	by	Hirsch	 (1978,	1997,	unpublished),	but	 further	work	 in	
this	area	would	be	valuable.	
Hyperintensionality	 and	Meaning.	 The	metasemantics	 of	 quantifier	 variance	 is	
avowedly	 intensional	—	 it	makes	no	direct	 appeal	 to	differences	 in	meaning	between	
necessarily	 equivalent	 sentences	 or	 expressions.	 Some	 critics	 (Hawthorne	 2009)	 have	
seen	this	as	an	objection	to	quantifier	variance.	We	disagree	(see	Hirsch	2016),	but	think	
that	the	connection	between	so-called	hyperintensionality	and	quantifier	variance	needs	
further	exploration,	along	a	number	of	dimensions.		One	of	these	dimensions	concerns	
cross-language	belief	 ascriptions.	 Suppose	 that	 in	 the	presence	of	 a	 brown	dog	 and	a	
green	turtle	a	speaker	of	U	asserts	the	true	U-sentence,	“There	is	something	here	that	is	
partly	brown	and	partly	green.”		Assuming	that	this	sentence	is	false	in	our	language,	it	
does	not	seem	that	we	have	any	sentence	in	our	language	that	is	synonymous	with	this	
true	U-sentence.	 	 It	may	 follow	 that	 English	 speakers	 cannot	 capture	 the	 fine-grained	
hyperintensional	content	of	the	belief	expressed	by	the	speaker	of	the	U-language.		We	
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do	 not	 think	 this	 as	 a	major	 problem	 for	 variance,	 but	 both	 the	 general	 and	 specific	
issues	deserve	further	clarification.			
Beyond	 Philosophical	 Ontology.	 Naturally	 enough,	 the	 original	 applications	 of	
quantifier	variance	were	aimed	at	demystifying	the	ontological	disputes	engaged	 in	by	
philosophers.	 But	 philosophers	 don’t	 have	 a	 monopoly	 here	—	 existence	 claims	 and	
questions	are	woven	into	nearly	every	aspect	of	our	approach	to	the	world.		Because	of	
this,	quantifier	variance	can	be	applied	to	many	areas	of	human	discourse,	potentially	
resolving	 various	 puzzles	 and	 eliminating	 confusions.	 	 As	 noted	 above,	 this	 has	 been	
done	in	mathematics,	leading	to	satisfying	accounts	of	both	mathematical	freedom	and	
the	 paradoxes	 of	 set	 theory.	 It	 is	 worth	 investigating	 what	 results	 when	 quantifier	
variance	 is	 applied	 to	 discourse	 about	 and	 within	 fiction,	 debates	 about	 species	 and	
natural	 kinds	 in	 biology,	 discussions	 of	 social-biological	 kinds	 like	 race	 and	 gender,	
theoretical	 posits	 in	 science,	 the	 posits	 of	 folk	 psychology	 and	 cognitive	 science,	 and	
beyond.	 	 Assuming	 that	 quantifier	 variance	 is	 the	 correct	 approach	 to	our	 concept	 of	
existence,	 it	 will	 be	 applicable	 to	 existential	 claims	 in	 all	 of	 these	 areas	 and,	 as	 has	
already	 been	 the	 case	 with	 mathematics,	 some	 of	 the	 applications	 may	 be	
philosophically	illuminating.	
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